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Supply Shock versus Demand Shock 
On the whole, new market-rate 
housing appears to beneft not just the 
region but also the local neighborhood. 
Tis suggests that market-rate housing 
should be an important part of any 
solution to the housing afordability 
crisis. Fears of increased rents near 
new buildings should not prevent 
governments from implementing 
desired reforms to regional housing 
supply.
We note two important caveats 
to our fndings. First, we estimate 
an average efect that may disguise 
variation across diferent types 
of buildings and neighborhoods. 
Amenity and reputation efects are 
highly subjective and may vary widely 
depending on the local context. 
Second, the buildings in our sample are 
in the types of places that developers 
historically have wanted to build. 
While these areas are central to the 
debate, the efects may be diferent 
in other types of neighborhoods. 
For example, developers rarely build 
market-rate units in very low-income 
areas with high vacancy rates, so our 
results do not speak to what would 
happen if they did. 
Notes 
1. A census tract is an area with about 
4,000 people. 
2. Our migration data contain one less 
year than our rent data, so we shif the 
buildings we study back by one year. 
This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/316/. 
Brian J. Asquith and Evan Mast are economists at
the Upjohn Institute. David Reed  is a community
development economic advisor at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
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Efects of
Unemployment Insurance
Reforms in Brazil 
Christopher J. O’Leary, Túlio Cravo, Ana Cristina Sierra, and Leandro Justino Veloso 
Te Brazilian unemployment 
insurance (UI) program was 
established in response to a severe 
economic recession in the 1980s. It 
is now the largest UI program in the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, 
with more than 40 million benefciaries 
between 2012 and 2016. Despite its 
size, the program operates in a labor 
market where more than one-third of 
all employees work in informal jobs 
not covered by UI. Because these latter 
workers receive no benefts when they 
are separated from their jobs, formal 
sector employment is desirable, and 
previous research has found signifcant 
fows of workers between the formal 
and informal sectors and back again, 
which UI receipt may facilitate. In 
particular, some employers may use UI 
to subsidize wages of workers they lay 
of and then recall afer UI benefts end. 
Some laid-of employees even continue 
to work informally in their prior 
jobs while receiving UI benefts (Van 
Doornik, Schoenherr, and Skrastins 
2017). Moreover, the UI program has 
historically been generous in terms 
of minimal eligibility requirements 
within the formal sector, which could 
further incentivize such back-and-
forth fows. 
Tese features have made Brazil’s UI 
program relatively expensive, and when 
a recession in 2014 further increased 
costs, the Brazilian government 
instituted reforms in the eligibility rules 
to contain future costs. We investigate 
the efects of two such changes in UI 
eligibility rules in 2015 that increased 
the work experience requirements for 
frst- and second-time UI applicants. 
While previous research estimated that 
these reforms signifcantly reduced 
layofs (Carvalho, Corbi, and Narita 
2018), our analysis, which relies on 
more complete administrative records, 
fnds smaller overall reductions in 
layofs, with somewhat larger decreases 
for workers with a single prior UI 
beneft spell. 
A Natural Experiment 
Te recession that began in early 
2014, coupled with the institutional 
features of Brazil’s UI program 
described above, led to calls for 
reforming the system. Facing general 
budget difculties and anticipating 
a signifcant rise in unemployment, 
Brazilian President Dilma Roussef 
issued Provisional Measure 665 in late 
December of 2014, raising UI eligibility 
requirements for frst and second 
time UI claimants, efective March 1, 
2015. Soon thereafer, the legislature 
passed a new law codifying eligibility 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Brazilian unemployment insurance (UI) program, established in 1990, is now 
the largest in Latin America.
n UI reforms in 2015 increased work experience eligibility requirements for first- and 
second-time UI applicants.
n We find reductions in layoffs are greater for workers with one prior UI spell than 
for first-time claimants.
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rules nearly as strict as the provisional 
measure, and this law took efect on 
June 17, 2015. Brazil thus experienced 
two sudden changes in UI eligibility 
rules in 2015, although these changes 
applied only for workers on their frst 
or second UI application; rules for the 
third and subsequent applications were 
unchanged. Consequently, the reforms 
were targeted toward recent labor 
market entrants. 
Specifcally, the reforms increased 
the minimum number of months of 
employment workers needed before 
they would qualify for the shortest 
beneft duration on their frst or 
second UI application. Prior to the 
frst reform, any UI applicant who had 
worked six months in the prior three 
years could qualify for three months of 
benefts (frst row of Table 1). Under 
both reforms, frst- and second-time 
UI applicants now needed longer 
recent work experience to qualify for 
the shortest potential beneft duration. 
For frst-time claimants, for example, 
the new minimum potential beneft 
shifed from three to four months, but 
the required work period increased 
from 12 to 18 months under the frst 
reform, before returning to 12 months 
under the second reform, a mere four 
months later. A summary of the work 
requirements for UI beneft eligibility 
under each set of eligibility rules is 
listed in the Table 1. 
Our evaluation focuses on short-
tenure workers who were most afected 
by the changes in UI eligibility rules. 
Using data that contains tenure at the 
daily level, we contrast job layof rates 
for a treatment group of workers with 
at least 6 and less than 7 months of 
job tenure against a control group of 
workers with at least 5 and less than 6 
months of job tenure. Under the initial 
regime, the treatment group with 6 
months of job tenure was eligible for 
three months of UI benefts but frst- 
and second-time applicants became 
ineligible for any benefts under both 
reforms. We estimate how diferences 
in layof risk between the treatment 
and control groups vary across the 
diferent regimes, an approach called 
diference-in-diferences. To isolate 
the impact of the reforms, we further 
adjust for diferences across individuals 
in their geographic location, calendar 
month in the data, and demographic 
characteristics. 
Efects on Layofs 
We fnd that the increase in work 
months needed for UI eligibility 
reduced employer layofs. For short-
tenure workers with no prior UI 
applications, the frst reform reduced 
layof risk by 0.18 percentage points 
(from a base layof rate of 3.4 percent). 
Te impact of the second reform 
was larger, cutting layof risk by 0.41 
percentage points relative to the period 
before either reform. 
Among workers who had one prior 
UI application, the reforms had even 
stronger impacts, with the frst reform 
reducing layof risk by 0.9 percentage 
points (from a base layof rate of 4.0 
percent), and the second reform by 
1.05 percentage points. 
While sizable, these efects are 
smaller than those implied by earlier 
studies that did not have as detailed 
data on the number of prior UI 
applications. When we approximate the 
methodology of previous studies by not 
accounting for the number of prior UI 
spells, we estimate a layof reduction 
from the frst reform of 0.35 percentage 
points, much smaller than earlier 
Program costs rose sharply with the
recession starting in 2014 as more
unemployed workers with sufcient
experience drew UI benefts. 
estimates of 0.53 percentage points 
(Van Doornik et al. 2018) to 0.69 
percentage points (Carvalho, Corbi, 
and Narita 2018). 
Reduction in Collusion 
In the United States, UI benefts are 
fnanced by experience-rated employer 
taxes that rise with total benefts paid 
to an employer’s former workers. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, layofs are 
lower in states where UI taxes rise more 
quickly with experience-rating (Card 
and Levine 1994). In contrast, Brazilian 
UI benefts are fnanced from general 
revenues, and neither employers nor 
workers pay specifc taxes to fnance 
the program. Consistent with this lack 
of implicit penalty for heavily using the 
system, Brazilian UI benefts appear to 
subsidize the fow between low-wage, 
short-term jobs and informal sector 
Table 1  Months of Employment Required for UI Benefts, 1990–2017 
Number of 
UI claim 
Potential 
beneft duration 
Initial regime 
(1990 to Feb. 27, 
2015) 
Reform 1 
(Feb. 28, 2015 to 
June 16, 2015) 
Reform 2 
(from June 17, 2015) 
First Three 6 —  — 
Four 12 18 12 
Five 24 24 24 
Second Three 6 —  9 
Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
Third or more Three 6 6 6 
Four 12 12 12 
Five 24 24 24 
NOTE: The table shows the number of months of formal employment required in the 36 months before UI 
application to be eligible for benefts, by number of UI claims and regime. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations from provisions in Law 7.998, PM 665, and Law 13.134. 
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Efects of Unemployment Insurance Reforms in Brazil 
Figure 1  Both Eligibility Reforms Reduced the Risk of Layofs layofs. However, our results indicate 
that previous studies overestimated 
Zero prior claims One prior claim these reductions, likely because they 
were unable to precisely measure 
individuals’ prior UI requests, a key 
parameter undergirding the changes 
in requirements. When we account for 
prior UI requests, we fnd that changes 
in UI eligibility rules reduced the 
chance of layof the most for workers 
with exactly one prior UI beneft 
receipt spell. Our results provide 
some evidence that restrictions on UI 
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jobs, in some cases back and forth 
with the same employer (Doornik, 
Schoenherr, and Skrastins 2017). 
We fnd the eligibility reforms 
afected this behavior, too. For short-
tenure workers with no prior UI claims, 
the probability of being rehired by the 
same employer within 4 to 10 months 
of layof fell by 1.3 percentage points 
afer the frst reform and 1.8 percentage 
points afer the second reform. For 
short-tenure workers with one prior UI 
claim, the frst reform reduced recall to 
the same employer by 1.7 percentage 
points, an amount similar to workers 
with no prior UI claims. However, the 
second reform did not appear to afect 
recalls for these workers. 
Conclusion 
We confrm results of previous 
research that Brazil’s 2015 increases 
in UI eligibility requirements reduced 
Figure 2  Both Eligibility Reforms Also Reduced Job Recall to the Same Employer 
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This article draws on research form an Upjohn Institute
working paper, which can be found at https://research
.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/318/. 
Christopher J. O’Leary is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute, and Túlio Cravo is a principal
economist at the African Development Bank. Ana
Cristina Sierra and Leandro Justino Veloso are
consultants to the Inter-American Development
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations. Bank. 
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